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THE PRESENT MADE FUTURE: 
KARL RAHNER'S ESCHATOLOGICAL 
DEBT TO HEIDEGGER 
Nicholas Adams 
It is well-known that Karl Rahner studied with Heidegger, but although 
there has been some recent interest in Rahner's eschatology, it is rarely 
recognised how substantially Rahner's discussion of the future draws on 
Heidegger's earlier writings on time. At the same time, it is increasingly 
desirable to show how technical issues in theology bear upon concrete politi-
cal practice in the public sphere. This article shows the extent of Rahner's 
use of Heidegger and explains how Rahner's understanding of the future 
relates to concrete questions of ethics and Christian self-understanding. 
Eschatology forms a central part of Karl Rahner's mature theology. For 
Rahner the future, understood as God's future for humankind, is an integral 
part of how Christians describe the present. Rahner partially blurs the tem-
poral boundaries between present and future in order to describe political 
issues associated with planning and the relationship between how the king-
dom of God is pictured and the political practices that it informs. For this 
reason, Rahner's eschatology offers an excellent example of the way a tech-
nical discussion in systematic theology informs profoundly practical issues 
in the public sphere. This article offers a sketch of what Rahner seems to 
have meant by the future together with a demonstration of its connection to 
issues of planning and other politically oriented modes of reasoning. 
It is worth noting at the outset that one of the commonly encountered 
problems in presenting Rahner's work is his practice of referring to sec-
ondary sources or direct influences only very rarely. It is thus sometimes 
difficult to decide which kinds of debate provide an appropriate context 
within which to evaluate his own opinions and judgements. The questions 
addressed here are illuminated most clearly when discussed in the context 
of the work of Martin Heidegger. Rahner's own view of time, for example, 
becomes clearly illuminated when contrasted to what Heidegger says of 
the future in his own early work. 
Rahner's contribution to questions of eschatology in the 1960s and 1970s 
largely turns on the difference between specifically Christian understand-
ings of the future - the future of creation attested in Scripture and in partic-
ular forms of worship - and secular approaches, be they loosely pragmatic 
or more strictly Marxist.! The main categories which frame Rahner's posi-
tion are those of "mystery" and the "absolute future" as something consti-
tutive of what it is to be human. Heidegger's influence on Rahner makes an 
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engagement with Heidegger's view of the future in Being and Time of 1927 
unavoidable. What makes Rahner's relationship to Heidegger particularly 
interesting is his reliance on a philosophy which, like Marx's, understood 
itself as overtly and uncompromisingly untheologicaU This is perhaps 
something of a liability for a theologian who seeks to articulate a distinctly 
Christian view, not least because Rahner nowhere explicitly articulates his 
disagreements with, or divergences from, Heidegger. Consequently some 
of Rahner's work runs the risk of offering only a commentary on the differ-
ences between views of the "future" in Heidegger and those in Marx, siding 
largely as Rahner does with Heidegger. Unlike the case of the Protestant 
theologian Rudolf Bultmann, whose relationship and frequent meetings 
with Heidegger are well documented, Rahner's own dependence on 
Heidegger is difficult to describe at all confidently: Rahner himself does not 
explicitly describe how he uses Heidegger's anti-"metaphysical" philosoph-
ical project. Despite these difficulties, and given Heidegger's own problem-
atic and difficult relationship to questions of political practice in the public 
sphere, this issue cannot be avoided if one wishes to take seriously the use-
fulness of Rahner's eschatology for contemporary Christian practice. 
Absolute Future and the Extended Present 
The task Rahner sets himself in his essay "The Hermeneutics of 
Eschatological Assertions" can be given a simple precis: how should state-
ments about the future found in scripture best be understood, particularly 
in the light of culturally predominant current understandings of time 
which largely describe time as a linear succession of events? His answer 
can also be given relatively plainly: eschatological assertions made before 
the modem period presuppose a radically different understanding of time, 
which incorporate an altogether richer understanding of the freedom and 
Grace that must (for Christians) accompany understandings of worldly 
causality.3 Drawing upon a largely Heideggerian lexicon, it is Rahner's 
intention to challenge what might be called positivist interpretations of 
scriptural texts (which exercise a hermeneutic more appropriate to inter-
preting a weather report) and at the same time demonstrate the kinds of 
political responsibility that follow from a deeper understanding of scrip-
tural assertions about God's future. 
If eschatological assertions are not like weather reports (or press reports 
in advance) how should we best understand them? Rahner distinguishes 
between apocalyptic and eschatology: 
whenever there is speech [in Christian theology] about the future 
whose intended content is the anticipated report of a spectator con-
cerning a coming event, there is a false apocalyptic (Rahner IV, 410 
[330)).4 
Echoing Kierkegaard's remarks about faith in Fear and Trembling, 
Rahner suggests that apocalyptic, wrongly understood, reduces the future 
merely to a "distantly outstanding object (abstiindig Ausstiindige)." (IV, 408 
[329])5 By contrast 
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Eschatology is therefore not an anticipated report of events to follow 
later on ... but the necessary forward-looking glance for the person in 
his or her spiritual decision in its dual aspects of freedom and faith .... 
This looks toward the completion of an already eschatological situa-
tion (IV, 414-5 [334]). 
Rahner dismisses what he calls "metaphysical doctrine" and privileges 
the notion of "decision", which strongly suggests the influence of 
Heidegger's earlier work. This deserves some examination, as it will 
become clear that Rahner's understanding of eschatology as discourse 
about that which is "futurally present (kunftiges Anwesende)" (IV,408 [329]) 
derives with very little alteration from those sections in Being and Time on 
the temporality of Dasein. Such an existential framework for understand-
ing eschatological assertions always presupposes that the "future" present-
ed in biblical accounts exercises a practical claim. Eschatology is thus, for 
Rahner, speech about a future which pragmatically shapes human self-
understanding: 
Man holds himself, directs himself, understands himself, in and by 
retaining his past anamnetically, and by being prognostically present 
to the outstanding future (IV, 411 [331]). 
This use of prognosis has almost nothing to do with what has come to 
be known as futurology, which presupposes that the human agent is little 
more than a spectator (as in meteorology or "balanced" journalism), but 
rather insists that the prognostic self is herself unavoidably engaged in a 
practical grasp of what is to come. What this might mean will emerge in 
the later discussion. In such a realm, the subject has no perspective outside 
the temporal chain of events: 
knowledge of the future, in so far as it is still outstanding, is an inner 
moment of the self-understanding of man in his presence - and it 
comes out of it (IV, 411 [331]). 
Two important factors follow from this. Firstly, eschatology is better 
understood as the "futurity of the present"; secondly this futurity is to some 
extent an "incalculable, uncontrollable force," which is to say that it encom-
passes freedom at a level which confounds the limited self-knowledge of 
the individual subject. By the "futurity of the present" Rahner seems to 
mean something like this: if someone has a particular self-understanding (as 
a Christian, for example) then this implies a participation in a constellation 
of social aspirations and roles which help shape concrete judgements, and 
these in tum imply a future. A strictly pragmatic version of this insight 
might be that a builder's self-understanding, at any stage of construction, 
implies having built a house. A more complicated theological version 
might be that a Christian's self-understanding, at any stage of cultural for-
mation, implies God's redemption of creation in Christ. The important dif-
ference between being a builder and being a Christian is that while a 
builder's practical horizons can be articulated quite definitely ("house"), a 
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Christian's horizons unavoidably transcend any particular achievement. 
This is because the redemption of creation is, from our limited human per-
spective, indeterminate and unknowable. For this reason, Rahner insists 
that a fundamental feature of eschatology is its confrontation of the future's 
unassailable "mystery" and its unsayable absoluteness. A Christian 
builder, for example, may build a house but her house will never have fully 
embodied the redemption of creation, even if it participates in that redemp-
tion through being a house in which God is rightly worshipped. 
Eschatologically, the future is always part of the present. It is in this light 
that one may best understand what Rahner means when he says: 
As a Christian, a man knows about his future because he knows (and 
so far as he knows) about himself and his redemption in Christ 
through God's revelation. His knowledge concerning the eschata is 
not a communication additional to dogmatic anthropology and 
Christology, but their transposition into the grammatical mood of 
completion (IV, 415 [335]). 
It is the participative, social nature of eschatology, together with the 
future's mysterious and indeterminate freedom, that makes so-called apoca-
lyptic meteorological assertions about the future of creation false. Such false 
assertions deny the subject's own roles and responsibilities in the production 
of the worldly future and thus" de-eschatologise" him, and make of him "a 
being who in his present is not concerned with the future, because the future 
is only this distantly outstanding object" (IV, 408 [328-9]). By contrast 
biblical eschatology must always be read as a statement coming from 
the revealed present and going towards the real future; not as a state-
ment coming from an anticipated future going to the present. To as-
sert (A us-sage) from the present into the future is eschatology; to in-
sert (Ein-sage) from the future into the present is apocalyptic ... The 
eschatological statement belongs to man's nature and, when it deals 
with the present as revealed by the word of God, is Christian escha-
tology. The apocalyptic in-sertion is either fantasy or gnosticism ... 
(IV, 418-9 [337]).6 
This distinction between the existential futurity of the present and the 
future merely understood as the linear continuation of the present sets the 
stage for Rahner's engagement with what he understands as the predomi-
nant forms of secular orientations to tl1e future. 
The expectation of the future voiced by those Rahner calls "Marxists" is 
"a future which is possible, really internal to the world, foreseeable, which 
is categorially describable and which can be planned" (VI, 77 [59]). 
Although Rahner does not routinely use the term, this might be named the 
"determinate future," and it can be compared with the "absolute future," 
an expression found in all of Rahner's essays on the future, and which 
means a future which transcends every "worldly and categorisable 
future." The word "absolute" refers in this context to that which is uncon-
ditioned. By definition the absolute future is finally umeconcilable with 
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the determinate future, because the latter refers to that which is bounded, 
conditioned and particular. What makes Rahner's account of the absolute 
future interesting, however, are the specific ways in which it is not wholly 
assimilable to a philosophical framework based on Kant, who was the first 
philosopher to use words like "absolute" routinely. 
For Kant the idea of that which is unconditioned or absolute arises from 
reason's abstraction from all particular conditioning, in particular the limita-
tions of space and time.7 We come to apprehend objects because of their 
boundedness in space and time, and come to acquire an abstract notion of 
space and time and can entertain - if only formally - the notion of some-
thing that is not bounded in this way, even though such absoluteness can-
not in principle be experienced as a thing. Kant moves from here to a view 
that the idea of the unconditioned functions for reason as the totality of con-
ditions and thus in some sense the rational "ground" of the conditioned. 
The kind of language used by Rahner, by contrast, is of a different kind.s 
Christianity ... understands itself, and can be understood, from the 
future which it knows as absolute, coming towards humans and 
humankind ... the absolute future is the true and real future of man; it 
is real possibility for him, an offer which is coming towards him (VI, 
78-9 [60-1]). 
Whereas, for Kant, an absolute notion is a product of reason, and there-
fore functions merely as a regulative standard (it must be postulated but it 
has no intentionality of its own), Rahner insists that the absolute future has 
its own peculiar kind of personal agency and is that with which human 
beings can establish some kind of relationship: 
The true future, the last thing which is itself un-makable by us, hap-
pens quite simply; it comes towards us .... We are those who experi-
ence its lightning in the hope that our experience of darkness may 
tum out to be a consequence of the future's dazzling brightness, and 
that it might not kill us but save us eternally (VIlI, 560 [X, 240]). 
This constitutive element of human understanding of the world is not 
only the "condition of the possibility of a categorised worldly planning" 
but is itself the creator of all futures: "Christianity is the religion of the 
absolute future" (VI, 79 [61]). In a particularly bold statement Rahner says 
Absolute future is only another name for what is really meant by 
"God" ... God, as absolute future, is fundamentally and necessarily 
the unsayable mystery ... (VI, 80-81 [62])9 
Rahner is careful not to suggest that the absolute future defines or 
exhausts what is meant by "God" and this relates to the fact that the term 
"absolute future" is itself not exhaustively definable. "God" and "absolute 
future" do, however, refer to each other. The reasons for positing this 
identification are not explicitly given but there are at least two plausible 
possibilities. Firstly, it is important to escape from the Kantian regulative 
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framework which would reduce the absolute future to the rationally recon-
structed pool of possibilities for all determinate futures. This would exer-
cise no binding claim on human judgements because right from the outset 
it is divorced (abstracted) from any particular form of life.lO Secondly, by 
identifying the absolute future with God, the stakes are raised in any 
encounter with what Rahner calls "Marxist Utopia": any determinate 
future cannot be made a final goal, in Rahner's scheme, without explicitly 
committing an act of idolatry. Rahner rejects both purely rational theology 
(where God is no more than an idea of reason) and the kind of pantheism 
where God is identified with, and known as, the substance of the world. 
Having asserted unambiguously that no determinate instance of plan-
ning can be considered final, and having claimed that Christian worship is 
oriented to God's completion of creation, Rahner is clear that the rejection 
of "utopian ideology" - which posits "a determinate, single reality of the 
pluralistic world of experience as an absolute, fixed point" - does not mean 
that one is uninterested in the future in an everyday sense: the tomorrows 
of next week and next year. On the contrary: we are confronted with polit-
ical tasks and responsibilities. 
Christianity is not merely neutral with respect to sensible planning of 
the kind of future that is internal to the world but adopts a positive 
orientation to it. It treats this rational, actively planned construction 
of the worldly future ... as a task given with the divinely willed being 
(Wesen) of humanity (VI, 83 [64]). 
This is an important comment about the limits of theological appeals to 
truth. Whilst Christian theological claims, at their most fundamental level 
(such as in creeds and doctrines), must remain appropriately agnostic 
about "the material content of this future" - that is, our concrete tomorrows 
- nevertheless, Christian practices of worship make a fully engaged practi-
cal orientation not merely unavoidable but positively demanded. As a 
mere theologian, Rahner knows he has no special authority to make infalli-
ble pronouncements about the concrete future required of us by God; nev-
ertheless as a responsible Christian he must exercise good judgement 
about which instances of concrete planning and practice are most appro-
priate to a Christian understanding of graced human subjectivity. Before 
considering this question further, it will be helpful to gain a clearer idea of 
Rahner's relationship to Heidegger's philosophy. 
Originary Temporality 
The explicit philosophical influences on Rahner's theology are well 
known." Detailed evaluation of such influences, however, is made difficult 
by the fact that Rahner's own reading habits are not known in detail, and 
some of his most important writings do not offer substantial apparatus that 
might guide the reader to his sources. Nevertheless, it is illuminating to 
compare Rahner's position with Heidegger's classical statements in Being 
and Time. In order to take up a perspective on Rahner's appropriation of 
Heidegger it is necessary to have a relatively clear view of Heidegger's 
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own contribution to philosophical understandings of the future. 
Concerning Heidegger's pragmatic or non-pragmatic view of time, opinion 
is divided12 The part of Heidegger's early work which bears most directly 
upon Rahner's eschatological categories is division two section III of Being 
and Time, on the temporality of Dasein, and in particular the authentic 
forms that this temporality can and should take. The other major text 
which provides useful orientation is Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, 
written in 1927, but as this was only published in 1975, it did not directly 
influence the writings by Rahner under consideration here. The key terms 
relevant to this discussion are temporality (Zeitlichkeit), resoluteness 
(Entschossenheit) and the advancing future (Zu-kunft). 
For Heidegger, in conscious opposition to Kant, temporality is not mere-
ly a condition for the subject's constitution of objects but is itself a condi-
tion for understanding that kind of subjectivity itself;J3 it is the "horizon 
from which we understand being."J4 Temporality and its role as an intrin-
sic aspect of Dasein is most clearly brought into focus in Heidegger's dis-
cussion of death and the future. Briefly, for Heidegger, Dasein is rightly 
understood as being which orients itself to its own dying in such a way as 
to do justice to its finiteness. This kind of orientation Heidegger names 
"resoluteness." "Authentic" Dasein (the kind of being to which one should 
aspire) thus manifests - and is - a resoluteness in its anticipation of death 
(5Z 302 [349-50]).15 Crucial to this kind of statement is an acknowledge-
ment that death is not simply a future event that occurs at the end of life 
but is something whose importance is constantly part of present life. 
Anticipation brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is con-
stantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to 
when that possibility will become an impossibility (5Z 308 [356]). 
What Dasein has the capacity to be - its "ownmost possibility" - must 
entail a confrontation with its own ending, with its own final impossibility 
in order that it may correctly understand its own provisionality. Only 
Dasein that has grasped its own contingency can avoid deluding itself and 
can thus act with a resoluteness that is not a form of escape or a make-
believe "overcoming of death" (5Z 310 [357]). Dasein should thus have a 
particular orientation to the future which accepts that its end is coming and 
that an appropriate kind of living must integrate this fully into its self-
understanding. Dasein which has such a self-understanding can then ori-
ent itself practically towards its own positive possibility. 
Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially ... is 
being towards one's ownmost distinctive potentiality-for-being. This 
sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards 
itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possi-
bility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself - in 
other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself is that 
distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phe-
nomenon of the future as coming towards (Zu-kunft) (5Z 325 [372]). 
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There is, in other words, a dimension to Dasein that is "possibility": its 
"what it can be" has not yet been realised, but this "what" nevertheless 
shapes what Dasein is at any current moment. Dasein's integral future (to 
be distinguished from events in its life that are merely yet to occur) is 
something that is experienced as an advent of its own possibilities to which 
Dasein responds (or fails to respond) in an appropriate fashion. 
By the term "futural" (zukiinjtiges), we do not here have in view a 
"now" which has not yet become "actual" and which some time will 
be for the first time. We have in view the coming (Kunjt) in which 
Dasein, in its owrunost potentiality-far-being, comes towards itself. 
Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way 
that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, 
is always coming towards itself - that is to say, in so far as it is futural 
in its being in general (5Z 326 [373]). 
The insistent usage of the present tense to characterise Dasein's futurity 
is a central feature of Heidegger's strategy to confound a purely linear 
view of time. In his discussion of temporality Heidegger says quite plainly 
"we must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of 'future,' 
'past,' and 'present' which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary 
conception of time" (5Z 326 [374]). The kind of futurity that in some way 
gives rise to the present is a "primordial," deeper kind of futurity: "we do 
not have in mind 'in advance of something' [das 'Vorher'] in the sense of 
'not yet now - but later'" because this would just tum Dasein into the kind 
of object that is simply observed rather than a being which can understand 
itself and anticipate its own comprehended possibilities. Heidegger's 
means for evoking this kind of active participation in - and bringing-about 
- of Dasein's own future entails a redescription of the kind of temporality 
that characterises our subjectivity. He goes so far as to make extreme state-
ments, such as "The primary meaning of existentiality is the future" and "The 
primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future" (5Z 
327; 329 [376; 378], his emphasis). Hence, although there may well be a 
sequence of events which would appear to an observer to make up a histo-
ry of a particular Dasein, the latter cannot treat events merely as a spectator 
but must (or risk inauthenticity) adopt a more synoptic approach where 
both past and future are said to form each present.!6 With Olafson, " ... what 
Heidegger wants to assert becomes clear in his analysis of the 'moment' 
(Augenblick) as the configuration of temporality in which the active charac-
ter of Dasein is not obscured by a false assimilation to world-time. In the 
moment, Dasein does not await the future, but projects it as that which it 
has chosen and is acting to bring about."17 Future, past and present can be 
said to form an "original unity" which makes Dasein possible, and from 
which Dasein takes up its practical responsibilities.18 
With this kind of picture in view it is possible to see why Heidegger 
claims, at the beginning of Being and Time, that temporality is so important 
as to be "the meaning of" Dasein. If this transformed understanding of tem-
porality, particularly the future, is convincing then it is important to under-
stand what status this Zu-kunjt has vis a vis the kind of future which does 
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refer to events yet-to-come. If Dasein is engaged in anticipating its own pos-
sibilities, then this will certainly produce concrete events and particular acts 
which very much participate in some linear temporal causative succession. 
If "the present is just a particular aspect of the act in which Dasein acts 
toward a possible future for itself,"!9 that is, if it is part of an original unity 
with a practical movement towards particular possibilities, then one must 
ask about the ways in which "futurity" is related to possible futures. How 
is the existential category" anticipation" manifested in ordinary acts? Even 
more simply: is Dasein's "possibility" to be seen as a goal to be realised? 
This question can be most clearly set out by considering a debate 
between two views of Heidegger. The first is most clearly exemplified by 
Mark Okrent. In Okrent's pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger, "possi-
bility" is something made up of things which can in principle be finished. 
Temporality is "the structure of Dasein's purposive social activity" towards 
a future goal, and Dasein is itself an acting towards a social end; its acting is 
"aware of that end as to be accomplished."20 On this model "possible 
future" is explicitly equated with what is "to be accomplished." This is 
supported by noting Heidegger's borrowing from Husserl of the concept 
of "horizon" - temporality is the horizon from which we understand being 
- as laid out in the Cartesian Meditations: the horizons of every subjective 
process are "predelineated potentialities," and the latter 
are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities intentionally pre-
delineated in respect of content ... and in addition, having the charac-
ter of possibilities actualizable by the Ich.2! 
A horizon is not just the necessary condition for any understanding of 
being but also refers to possibilities that can be finished by an act or a series 
of acts. In drawing out the implications of this kind of understanding of 
horizon, Okrent suggests that there is a "horizon par excellence" or "ulti-
mate horizon" in our consciousness of internal time, and every actual 
intentional act is placed within this unlimited context. Intentionality is 
thus the situating of an object within a structured horizon which is shaped 
socially by what is handed down and what is anticipated: a "concretely 
delimited horizon, which is necessary if we are to understand anything 
that is as something that is."22 
There is a problem with this, however. In speaking of an "ultimate hori-
zon" in which particular realisable possibilities are placed it becomes 
extremely complicated to say how such a horizon of all horizons relates to 
concretely possible events, other than simply asserting that it is their "con-
dition." Heidegger himself, by contrast, seems to say that temporality is 
not only the field within which events take place but is itself an active con-
tributor whose agency derives from Dasein's response to its perceived pos-
sibilities. Olafson suggests that there is a question here about the "whole-
ness" of Dasein, the degree to which it can finish its tasks: "This question 
arises out of the account of transcendence as the movement of Dasein 
toward its possibilities, its always being 'out ahead of itself' (Sich-vor-weg-
sein) in such a way that at every moment of its life there is something unre-
solved and incomplete about it."23 On this view, Dasein's "possibility" is 
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never completed until it is finished by death, and concrete realisable possi-
bilities materialise against an ever-receding background of other possibili-
ties. The completion of Dasein is thus something not available (or "present-
at-hand") to be inspected or known in advance. It can nevertheless be 
comprehended in some less-than-fully-concrete way: 
To be sure, I cannot grasp just what my complete identity will be. But 
I nevertheless know, even from within my own standpoint, how to 
view my life as something I have the potential to realize.24 
It is this kind of "how" of Dasein's orientation to its ending that "anticipa-
tion" describes, for Heidegger. The "how" of its outlook can embrace, in 
principle, an unlimited number of possible "whats" (concrete realisations of 
particular possibilities), and this may be a helpful way of understanding the 
relationship between Dasein's "ownmost possibility" and its realisable goals 
- no particular one of which can be equated with that existential possibility 
itself. "Possibility" as an existential category is perhaps best understood 
precisely as the "how" that fundamentally shapes each finite act ventured 
by Dasein. It follows from this that giving concrete content (a "what") to the 
orientational "how" will always be a matter of judgement which, with var-
ied success, does justice to Dasein's perceived possibility; which is more or 
less "authentic" in Heidegger's terms. For Heidegger, the desired "how" is 
an attitude of resolute anticipation of Dasein's ownmost possibility in the 
face of death in every decisive "moment." Death, which completes Dasein, 
is itself a possibility that can materialise at any moment: it is a "constant 
threat" (SZ 265 [310]) to which there corresponds a demand that Dasein live 
up to its wholeness and authenticity (SZ 269 [314]). The practical "how" 
which results from Dasein's understanding of its possibility is thus a 
response to an address. Heidegger does not spell out in any simple fashion 
how he can know what such an address demands, but it is at least clear that 
he believes Dasein experiences its possibility as that which exercises a claim 
or a call. Authenticity is thus, for Heidegger, unquestionably binding for 
Dasein, although presumably the specific forms which such a claim might 
take are subject to the interpretive judgement of Dasein - something that 
seems to be overlooked in some of Heidegger's more positive assertions, 
where distinctly questionable forms of content are marshalled to fill the for-
mal space of "authenticity" or "possibility."25 
If, in Heidegger's wider scheme, understanding an object is competence 
in deploying it in accordance with its appropriate role in some context (e.g. 
understanding a hammer is competence to use it as a hammer) then the 
self-understanding of Dasein is, accordingly, competence with oneself. That 
is, self-understanding entails deploying oneself in accordance with one's 
appropriate role. For Heidegger, the future of originary temporality is what 
William Blattner calls "the sense of" this self-competence.2h Given the equa-
tion of "future" with "ownmost possibility" it seems proper to consider the 
latter as a "sense of" something. Dasein's "ownmost possibility" is its sense 
of its roles and responsibilities in its particular context. If this is placed next 
to an understanding that the only completion of Dasein is death, then it 
makes less sense to think of "possibility" as Dasein's striving to realise its 
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ends than to think of it as a more formally existential orientation. 
The second view of Heidegger is best seen in Blattner's interpretation. 
Blattner proposes a detailed reading of Heidegger's following statements: 
"The future is not later than been-ness" (5Z 350, Blattner's translation) and 
"Future" does not here mean a Now, which not yet having become 
"actual," sometime will be, but rather the coming, in which Dasein 
comes towards itself in its ownmost ability-to-be (5Z 325, Blattner's 
translation). 
Blattner objects to the pragmatic readings of Olafson and Okrent on the 
grounds that they rely too heavily on a notion of Dasein's self-competence 
as an ability to realise - that is, complete - its own possibilities; in Okrent's 
words Dasein's social role is something "to be accomplished." Blattner 
notes that for this to be true, the "future" of Dasein must, in contradiction 
to the Heidegger quoted above, be "later than" been-ness. 
Moreover, all talk of trying to realize my ends ... seems to imply that 
I can actualize or realize myself by bringing myself (or my future 
states) about in the future. Yet Heidegger says that this future that I 
am as coming towards myself is not something that could be actuap7 
The implication of this is drawn out so as to discourage any interpreta-
tion which moves too quickly from the formal futural "how" or "sense of" 
(Hoffman and Blattner respectively) to the "what" or the "realisable possi-
bility" that Dasein may judge to be an appropriate goal for action. Blattner 
uses the example of one's orientation to a particular career as an example: 
The sense of "possibility" on which Heidegger relies is not that of 
"possible actuality," for it can never (come to) be that I have (already) 
made myself a lawyer, for example. The point is not that there are 
conditions on being a lawyer that no one can ever satisfy ... The point 
is rather that adopting a role (casting oneself in it) is not attempting 
to bring about some possible, future state of myself. Casting myself 
as a lawyer does not terminate in accomplishment or failure, because 
it does not terminate.28 
In order to be a lawyer, therefore, one needs to do something rather 
deeper than simply pass law exams and take up a practice. "Casting one-
self in a role" is not something achieved and inserted on a curriculum vitae 
but something continually ongoing. Roles, in Blattner's sense, are thus 
quite different from physical features such as height or hair colour. A 
hammer's being "for hammering" is different from its being made of 
wood, and being "for hammering" is its future, so to speak. The fact that a 
hammer has been used for hammering does not "complete" its being "for 
hammering," although it is an appropriate use, given its assigned role. 
Dasein differs from a hammer in so far as it understands its being for a role, 
and thus takes up an active futural orientation. It is because of this that 
Blattner makes the initially odd-sounding claim that Dasein's possibility is 
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not something that it can have achieved (which makes it sound distinctly 
impossible). Dasein's possibility is achieved in being that possibility, never in 
having been it. This kind of convergence of past, future and present makes 
better sense of the "original unity" that Heidegger ascribes to them. Thus 
one can say that taking a role is an understanding of one's fuhue, a future 
that is only completed in death: 
There is a sense of potency, ability, of "not yet," that characterizes 
Dasein, but that cannot be cashed out by saying that Dasein can or is 
able to become, or that Dasein is not yet, but will be later. Thus 
Heidegger says, "The "ahead" ['Vor'] does not mean the 'in advance' 
['Vorher'] in the sense of the 'Not-yet-now - but later' ['Noch-nicht-
jetzt - aber spiiter']". 29 
It is important not to underemphasise that the "present" of such a prac-
tical self-understanding does not denigrate concrete goals (the goals appro-
priate to being a lawyer, for example) but at the same time the meaning of 
the future of originary temporality is not best interpreted as being primari-
ly concerned with bringing about such goals. Particular goals are insepara-
ble from roles, but futurity and "ownmost possibility" refer first and fore-
most to the roles themselves: the "how" and the "sense of" Dasein's practi-
cal orientations to its future. With this in mind one can read Rahner's 
eschatological notions with a better sense of their relationship to 
Heidegger's description of Dasein's temporality. 
Rahner after Heidegger 
Given the clear ways in which Heidegger's understanding of time bears 
upon the earlier discussion of Rahner's "absolute future," it will not be nec-
essary to rehearse in detail how his various borrowings can be traced back 
to their Heideggerian sources.30 Two characteristic examples of Rahner's 
whole approach clearly demonstrate how thoroughly he has assimilated 
much of the foregoing: 
if the present of man's Dasein is what is referred to the future, the lat-
ter, remaining the future as such, is not merely something articulated 
in advance but is an inner moment of man and of his actual present 
in his being ... (IV, 411 [331]). 
A human being (and humanity) is the reality which knowingly and 
willingly is always before itself, which constitutes itself by devising 
its future, or better by devising itself (i.e. its being) towards that future 
(VI, 79 [61]). 
There are many other such overtly Heideggerian passages in Rahner's 
work, such as those in which he speaks of the future as something one 
"lays hold of" or as an "inner moment of human existence." Of rather 
greater interest are the ways in which Rahner diverges from Heidegger 
and incorporates other perspectives into his notion of eschatology. 
Importantly, while the concept of the futurity of humanity derives from 
PRESENT MADE FUTURE 203 
Heidegger, the idea of the "absolute future" was developed in dialogue 
with Marxists who (in Rahner's view) placed too great an emphasis on 
achievable planned events serially "in the future."31 Unlike Heidegger, 
whose articulation of Dasein's "resoluteness" seeks to evade the temporal 
series almost completely, Rahner's own response attempts to do more 
explicit justice both to an existential futurity (a Christian participation in 
redemption) and to show that this must include all political planning 
(which without doubt needs a very firm grasp of "ordinary time") which 
affirms responsible action in the public sphere but refuses to allow any par-
ticular goal to claim to have achieved any final completion. Thus, where 
(at least in Blattner's interpretation) the Heidegger of part II of Being and 
Time is more interested in roles than in concrete possibilities, Rahner seems 
to want to keep these two themes together, so that Christian self-under-
standing is inseparable from serious questions of political planning (VI, 82 
[64]; VIII, 556 [X, 236]; IX, 529 [XII, 191]).32 It may also be significant that 
where Heidegger speaks of Dasein, Rahner talks of Mensch, thus shifting a 
model of the significant sphere of subjectivity (the "who" in acts of think-
ing, speaking and doing) towards a more obviously social agent. Dasein 
certainly understands itself in a social situation in Heidegger's work -
indeed, Dasein is remarkable for just such a social network of roles - but 
the major existential decisions, calls of conscience and confrontations with 
death seem largely to be directed at the individual. Dasein does not seem, 
in Being and Time, to have a plural reference in as strong a way as "humani-
ty" or "we Marxists" does. To the extent that Rahner's eschatology 
embraces a more collective self-understanding, his thinking is better suited 
than Heidegger's to considering directly political questions that require the 
co-ordination of different bodies in the discharging of shared tasks.33 
The one quite distinctive characteristic of Rahner's eschatology that con-
stitutes an important contribution to speech about the future is the insis-
tence that the future is utter mystery (IV, 408ff. [329ff.]; VI, 80ff. [62ff.]; VIII, 
555ff. [X, 235f£.]; IX, 526 [XII, 188ff.]).34 The theologian's task is not to unveil 
that mystery through some privileged futurological or quasi-meteorologi-
cal activity but rather to articulate the ways in which humans might rightly 
respond to it in particular times and places: 
.. .it must obviously be said that humans can and must plan the 
future, project and draft it in advance and manipulate it ... But this 
does not change the fact that even the question of the worldly future, 
fundamentally, cannot ever be adequately answered (IX, 529 [XII, 
191-2]). 
There is, for Rahner, no way of evading the mystery of the future. In 
part, this is important in order to give due weight to issues of freedom: 
If there is any real freedom ... then there is an open and dark worldly 
future which illuminates itself fundamentally for the historical sub-
ject in the act in which it is posited and so is made present (IX, 535 
[XII, 197]). 
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This is a relatively simple point whlch denies any kind of hlstorical 
determinism, the so-called Hegelian legacy in Marxist hlstorical material-
ism which is over-confident about its predictions. At the same time 
Rahner draws attention to the contingency of all human action: 
The future is not evolutionary, not planned, not at our disposal... The 
future silently lies in wait and springs out at us, tears up the nets of 
our plans, spoils the kind of "future" which we ourselves have 
planned ... (VIII,556 [X, 237]). 
This is not merely a banal reminder about the vulnerability of the best 
laid plans. Rahner here links the mystery of the future - whlch at one level 
refers to its unpredictability - to the claim that it makes, to the fact that 
futurity is part of what human being entails, and that an attitude to the 
future partly constitutes who we are. In other words, an inner constitutive 
aspect of being human is itself underdetermined and in principle unknow-
able. Every act of particular goal-oriented calculation must incorporate the 
absolutely incalculable: or risk being blind to issues that make any kind of 
practice meaningful: 
before the future alone can we pose the questions we answer to our-
selves; as the empowering of our free power - whlch can only bring 
about determinate things in the realm of what it has not itself 
brought about - it already stands open, and we can begin with it 
(VIII, 557 [X, 238]). 
Rahner is here attempting to articulate the wider context within whlch 
particular goals - the "worldly future" - are situated. However clearly a 
particular course of action may be perceived by the actors who plan to 
bring about a determinate conclusion, thls itself rests on a deeper ecology 
of conditions over whlch they do not exercise any control, and finally on 
what is unconditioned, on what is in principle uncontrollable.35 At this 
point one can summarise Rahner's principal contributions to discourse 
about the future. 
The "future" is, for Rahner, fundamentally formal: its concrete determi-
nations cannot be specified in advance, either by forms of gnosis or via 
determinist schemes of the type that occur in some (unspecified) "Marxist" 
writings. The future is an "inner" constitutive aspect of human self-under-
standing whlch addresses humanity as a collective body and imposes itself 
as an unfinishable task. It is thus up to the judgement of individuals and 
groups rightly to interpret thls task in such a way as to produce manage-
able and realisable tasks (the "worldly future") in the public sphere. The 
absolute future is inescapably incomprehensible - there is an absolute, 
blinding excess of it - but it nevertheless imposes itself as a question to 
every particular human action which should, Rahner claims, constitute 
some kind of contingent response to that question: 
Where Christianity is, at one and the same time, a real will towards 
the world and a Yes towards the absolute future - in a relationshlp of 
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mutual conditioning - it creatively brings forth something utopian 
which criticises the present and continues to push towards a new his-
torical future (IX, 537 [XII, 199]). 
This brief half-acknowledgement of Ernst Bloch indicates that the for-
mality of the future is made effective in concrete acts through the media-
tion of acts of political judgement. The relationship between form and con-
tent - a relationship which, according to Rahner, is unavoidably "fluid" 
(IV, 425 [345]) - is arrested in particular times and places so as to produce 
such critical apparatus as "standards" and "ideals" - which belong to the 
realm of the "utopian" (IX, 537 [XII, 198]) - and yet which are always pro-
visional and dependent on the "absolute future." 
Questions 
There are, however, important questions surrounding Rahner's use of 
the word "absolute." If acts of judgement arise from a "mutually condi-
tioning relationship ... between man's relation to his worldly future and his 
attitude towards his absolute future" (IX, 536-7 [XII, 198]) then it clearly 
matters how this absolute future is characterised. Put simply, if the 
absolute future is only mysterious - something excessive, unintelligible -
then it cannot condition anything in any particular way, just as a merely 
determinate future contains no internal criteria for deciding how to change 
itself: there is no meaningful way of judging whether one act is better than 
another. There are many possible ways to address this state of affairs. One 
is to make a fundamental claim about the world so as to give it an internal 
criterion (a strategy employed by Ernst Bloch in his The Principle of Hope, 
for example); another is to make a claim about the unconditioned (for 
Rahner, the "absolute future') by connecting it to God.36 "God," of course, 
however mysterious, is understood by Rahner, as a Christian, in a partinl-
lar way and, for him, speech about God has the capacity both to inspire 
and discipline the imagination. In order to give some content to the ruth-
lessly formal structure of the "absolute future" - in order for it to be at all 
meaningful - Rahner insists that the theologian's ignorance of future 
events (a quite normal human ignorance) is an advantage because her task 
is precisely to remind others that this ignorance is inescapable (IX, 519 [XII, 
181]). Having done this, the real question must centre upon the orientation 
which one takes up towards this unknown future; Rahner is quite clear 
that, because one cannot fruitfully enquire into the content of the future, 
one's ignorance needs to become docta ignorantia - an ignorance that is edu-
cated in some way.37 As a Christian theologian, Rahner associates this edu-
cation with revelation: 
Christian faith ... confesses that this absolute future of the world is 
not only offered as merely open possibility, but is infallibly and victo-
riously confirmed in Jesus Christ (IX, 520 [XII, 182]). 
In other words, the content of the formal entity" absolute future" is not 
given internally: any uneducated encounter with it is experienced as a 
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threatening mystery which rejects all attempts to comprehend it. This 
much is shared with Heidegger who affirms that however much Dasein 
may corne to understand itself, Sein remains threateningly unknowable. 
Both Rahner and Heidegger seem to be in agreement about the extent to 
which philosophy can provide answers at the level of being itself. Unlike 
Heidegger, however, Rahner does not make death the decisive event for 
human life. He controls, and to a certain extent abolishes, this agnosticism 
through Christology. In so doing, by understanding being, or the absolute 
future, in a particular way, Rahner is no longer engaged in a narrowly 
philosophical pursuit, not even a speculative one. When Rahner states 
confidently that the future is where one looks, in hopeful expectation, Hfor 
the love of God and of man" he is no longer engaged in the same type or 
level of discourse as that which conducts an analysis of the futural dimen-
sion of human self-understanding. The latter is a form of phenomenology, 
an exposition of what is in principle accessible, allegedly, to any enquirer 
who chooses to ask questions about how humans can be understood to 
have an orientation to the future. The following assertion is clearly of a dif-
ferent kind: 
the absolute future is God himself, or rather the deed of his absolute self-
communication, accomplished by himself alone (IX, 523 [XII, 185]). 
No degree of phenomenological analysis could yield this kind of state-
ment: it is a claim whose force derives from a context and a language in 
which the reader must already have learned to participate. In sum: 
Rahner's theology "includes" philosophical analysis, rather than being 
derived from it. 
It is important to note that any particular characterisation of the absolute 
future is not just a "standard" by which the outcome is measured -
because it has no concrete content that would be commensurate with the 
decision in question. Rather, as with Heidegger's portrait of futurity, its 
character is a constitutive part of the self-understandings of the partici-
pants in discussion, and shapes their aspirations, although it cannot deter-
mine them in any direct way, again because it is formal. What it certainly 
is not is an idealised determinate future which all real futures try to estab-
lish as nearly as possible. The redemption of creation (to take one exam-
pIe) is not something of which one can have a concrete blueprint, and 
which one can then attempt to approximate in individual instances. It is 
not attainable as a determinate future and, more importantly perhaps, is 
not even partially or "more or less" attainable as a determinate future. A 
better approach is to say that a determinate future is, to a greater or lesser 
degree, consonant with the demands made by the absolute future, and 
judgements made in the light of it may be more or less sound. By contrast, 
the absolute future itself is unconditioned and makes a claim which cannot 
be finally captured by any particular image, although particular images 
(which themselves can only arise through acts of judgement) certainly indi-
cate the nature of its claim in a particular circumstance. Particular human 
decisions should not anticipate achieving the absolute future, and particu-
lar human ideas about what the absolute future would be like should not 
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claim final validity. Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that an orientation 
to the absolute future is possible so long as it has particular formal qualities 
and not others. These formal qualities are to be understood as given, by 
and large, in the structures of a community's particular self-understand-
ings, practices and language. While they can be abbreviated and made the 
object of debate they are nevertheless best understood as something 
received, or already part of the social world, rather than consciously pro-
duced. The absolute future thus derives part of its authority through 
speech about it being handed down, which thus implies that it is inherent-
ly bound up with tradition. 
This interpretation of Rahner is not unassailable, by any means. Whilst I 
think that an emphasis of the" already" operative nature of theological pre-
suppositions to the absolute future (already operative in a particular lan-
guage and form of practice) does best justice to Rahner's differences from 
Heidegger, it would not be implausible to argue (as Fergus Kerr has) that 
Rahner tries to ground his fundamental claims by developing an apolo-
getic epistemology.38 Whichever of these positions one adopts, it is true 
that Rahner is unclear about what he takes to be the degree to which 
human knowledge of God seems to be culturally contingent. Rahner's 
belief that all human knowledge and judgement is "universally" condi-
tioned by God's grace needs to be matched by an acknowledgement that 
there is no internal validation of such a belief, and that it seems impossible 
to imagine the limits of such conditioning. To say that all human action is 
a participation in God's creative love, as Rahner does, is to reveal and artic-
ulate an ontology whose scope and validity is already taken for granted, 
which cannot be externally validated or judged. With this in mind, it is 
perhaps trivially true to say that Rahner's connection of absolute future 
with God is a consequence of such an imaginative Christian worldview 
and cannot be demonstrated independently. Such a suggestion is, at any 
rate, probably the only one that will enable a fruitful ongoing engagement 
with Rahner's eschatology. 
This discussion began with a promise to explore how technically formal 
theological issues bear upon concrete political practice. This turns out to 
be remarkably simple. Eschatology does not provide Christians with the 
concrete content of their political projects but makes explicit who they take 
themselves to be and reveals their future, to which they are already, as 
Christians, committed. Adapting Heidegger, Rahner asserts that eschatol-
ogy is a way of speaking that makes explicit the assumptions and roles 
implicit in casting oneself as a Christian. For Rahner, Christians under-
stand their roles and responsibilities to be a consequence of their participa-
tion in God's own life. Political judgements have to be made (Rahner's 
"innerweltlich" domain) in the light of this understanding, which is the con-
text of the absolute future. For Rahner, eschatology is the kind of speech 
which explores the nature of the absolute future, which is itself our own 
"given" inner self-understanding which we experience as our "futurity." 
Eschatology provides the intellectual and imaginative resources with 
which responsible Christians make judgements in those public spheres of 
politics which concern themselves with the future, above all in political 
planning. "Marxism" serves for Rahner as an umbrella for any kind of 
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political planning which makes any specific concrete goal into something 
"absolute." By contrast with such approaches, Christian eschatology, and 
thus Christian political practice, always places its particular plans and 
goals within the context of an excessive, absolute future which both makes 
possible and judges any particular futures we may try to bring about. In 
brief, God is not a human project, and neither is God's future. What God's 
future entails for us, and demands from us, is responsible judgement and 
decision-making, for which eschatology provides both resources and hope. 
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